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affirmative action initiated by the plaintiff, will not provide relief from
pervasive covert collection of information. The combination of an exclusionary evidentiary rule, based on the requirement of a warrant, and
injunctive relief would, however, be a potent weapon for discouraging
police activities likely to stifle the free and open exercise of the rights of
freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Since surveillance would
be permitted only if the need for it could be demonstrated to a judicial
officer, the police would not be forced into illegal conduct to carry out
the investigative and preventive activities demanded of them by society.
DONALD W. HARPER

Constitutional Law-Power of Congress To Exclude Persons
Duly Elected
In the congressional elections of 1966, Adam Clayton Powell was
duly elected to the Ninetieth Congress from the eighteenth congressional
district of New York. When the House of Representatives convened,
Powell was not administered the oath. On the same day, the House provided for the appointment of a select committee to determine Powell's
eligibility to take his seat.'
The committee found that Powell met the standing qualifications of
article I, section 2 of the Constitution.' The committee further reported,
however, that Powell had misappropriated public funds, had made false
reports on expenditures of foreign currency, and had asserted unwarranted
privilege and immunity from the processes of the courts of New York.'
The committee recommended that Powell be sworn and seated, but that
he be fined 40,000 dollars, censured, and deprived of his seniority.'
When the proposed resolution was presented to the House, an amendment was offered calling for Powell's exclusion and a declaration that
his seat was vacant.5 After heated debate, the amendment was adopted,
1113 CONG. REc. 16 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1967).
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., lst Sess. 31 (1967). The relevant part of
article I, § 2 declares:
"[n]o person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to
the Age of twenty-five years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in
which he shall be chosen."
'H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1967).

'Id. at 33.

'H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 4997, 5020 (1967).
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and House Resolution No. 278, in its amended form, was approved by
over a two-thirds margin.
Powell and thirteen voters of the eighteenth congressional district
brought suit requesting injunctive and declaratory relief. They alleged
that the House in voting to exclude Powell violated two specific provisions of the Constitution: article I, section 2, clause 1,6 because the
resolution was inconsistent with the mandate that the members of the
House shall be elected by the people of each state; and Article I, section 2,
clause 2,' which, it was asserted, sets forth the exclusive qualifications
for membership. The district court dismissed the complaint "for want of
jurisdiction of the subject matter."8 The court of appeals affirmed on
somewhat different grounds, with each judge filing a separate opinion.,
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed." The Court passed over
the claim under article I, section 2, clause 1, but held that under article
I, section 2, clause 2 the House had no power to exclude from its membership any person, duly elected by his constituents, who met the age,
citizenship, and residence requirements specified in the Constitution. In
so holding, the Court insisted that it was not dealing with a nonjusticiable political question."
The impact of Powell on the political-question doctrine is emphasized
through the fact that the Court, had it based its decision on article I,
section 2, clause 1, could have resolved the issue within accepted conceptions of justiciability. The theory embodied in this provision is that
the right of the people in each district to choose their congressional representatives is fundamental to a democratic system of government. As stated
' "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State

shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch
of the State Legislature."
7See note 2 supra.
'Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 360 (D.D.C. 1967).
' Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Writing for the
court, Judge Burger, now Chief justice of the United States, held that the case
involved non-justiciable political issues. Judge McGowan felt that the decision
by the House that the power to expel included the power to exclude, provided
a two-thirds vote was forthcoming, did not present an impelling occasion for
judicial scrutiny. Judge Leventhal concluded that "[t]he House had legislative
jurisdiction to consider and appraise the activities and fitness of Powell at the
time he presented his credentials." 395 F.2d at 611.
"7Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). For a lengthy analysis of Powelt,
see generally Symposimu--Comments on Powelt v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 1 (1969).
11395

U.S. at 549.
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by Robert Livingston in his speech before the New York ratification
convention, "The people are the best judges [of] who ought to represent
them. To dictate and control them, to tell them whom they shall not elect,
is to abridge their natural rights. '12 It is this "natural right" that is
the basis for the one man, one vote requirement in congressional districting.1 3 Justice Black in Wesberry v. Sanders4 said, "[n] o right is
more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election
of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must
live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote
is undermined."'
The same rationale was later a basis for the Court's decision in Bond
v. Floyd.' Julian Bond had been excluded by the Georgia House of
Representatives for making certain statements opposing the Vietnam War.
Georgia did not argue that Bond's statements violated any laws, but
contended that although such statements by a private person might be
protected by the first amendment, the state may nevertheless apply a
stricter standard to its legislators." The Court rejected this contention:
The interest of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is hardly
advanced by extending more protection to citizen-critics than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial
political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by
them, and be better able to assess their qualifications for office; also
so they may be represented in governmental debates by the person
they have elected to represent them.'8

When Adam Clayton Powell was elected to the Ninetieth Congress,
it was the twelfth consecutive time that his constituents had chosen him.
11 2

THE REcORDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 at 292-93 (rev. ed. M.

Farrand 1966) [hereinafter cited as Farrand], quoted in 395 U.S. at 541, n.76.

At the same convention Hamilton stated: "[T]he true principle of a republic is,
that the people should choose whom they please to govern them." Farrand 257,
quoted
in 395 U.S. at 540-41.
3
" ustice Douglas, concurring in Powell, stated in regard to the one man, one

vote principle: "When that principle is followed and the electors choose a person
who is repulsive to the Establishment in Congress, by what constitutional authority
can that group of electors be disenfranchised?" 395 U.S. at 553 (concurring
opinion).

"376 U.S. 1 (1964). The complaint alleged that plaintiffs "were deprived of
the full benefit of their right to vote," in violation of art. I, § 2, clause 1. Id. at 3.
18376 U.S. at 17.
U.S. 116 (1966).
"Id. at 132-33.
18385

Id. at 136-37 (emphasis added).
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In 1968 he was re-elected to the Ninety-First Congress.10 The citizens
of Harlem have consistently selected Powell despite the well-publicized
allegations against him. In view of the principles stated in such cases
as Wesberry and Bond, surely it follows that the power of the House to
disenfranchise an entire congressional district in violation of the express
terminology of the Constitution is reviewable by the Supreme Court.
But the Court passed over this ready-at-hand basis for disposition of
Powell's claim to resolve the issue under the constitutional clause directly
pertaining to qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives. In so doing, it elected to grapple once again with the doctrine of
1 that some
"political questions."2 It was not until Baker v. Carr"
illumination was finally cast upon the enigma of the doctrine of political
questions. That case involved the apportionment of the Tennessee legislature. All such previous cases had been held "political" and, therefore,
not justiciable.2 2 In holding that cases involving reapportionment of legislative bodies were not political questions, Justice Brennan, speaking for
the Court, reviewed much case law. His review revealed that "it is the
relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government [the separation of powers doctrine] ... which gives
rise to the 'political question.' ",23 He then ventured several factors by
which a dispute could be tested for determining whether it was political
in nature:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
",This time the House fined him 25,000 dollars, but seated him. H.R. Res. No.

2, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115

CONG.

REc. H21 (daily ed., January 3, 1969). This

event brought forth a suggestion of mootness, but that defense was rejected by the
Court in Powell. 395 U.S. at 495-500. See Justice Stewart's dissent, 395 U.S. at
559.
20 See generally, A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BUxANcH 183-198 (1962);

H. M. HART AND H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
192-209 (1953); Bickel, The Passive Virtues, foreword to The Supreme Court,
1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. RPv. 40 (1961); Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924); Finkelstein, Further
Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L. REv. 221 (1925); Scharpf, Jldicial
Review and the Political Question: A Fundamental Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517
(1966); Tollett, Political Questions and the Law, 42 U. DET. L.J. 439 (1965);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1

(1959); Weston, Political Questions, 38 HARV. L. REv. 296 (1925).
"369 U.S. 186 (1962).
"See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
"369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at
bar, there should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground
24
of a political question's presence.
From this list two ideas emerge as dominant. First, when a constitutional
power is specifically conferred upon a branch of government other than
the judiciary the exercise of that power is non-reviewable. Second, if there
is a possibility of divergent views between coordinate departments on a
question, or resolution of a problem by one branch may express an embarrassing lack of respect due to another branch, then the matter is
political and non-justiciable.
Although there is no precedent directly in point, 5 the principal federal
cases prior to Powell touching on the subject of legislative exclusion seemed
to reinforce the view that Congress has the sole authority to judge
its members. The issue was generally considered political and nonjusticiable. 6 In Sevilla v. Elizalde,7 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit declared that the power to pass on the qualifications
28
Similarly,
of legislators is "lodged exclusively in the legislative branch."
2 9
Court
Supreme
the
Cunningham,
rel.
ex
States
United
in Barry v.
"'Id. at 217.
2' "In our entire history, no case has been found where the judgment of either
House has been overruled in a judicial proceeding." Curtis, The Power of theHotse of Representatives to $Tidge the Qualifications of its Members, 45 TEX.
L. Ruv. 1199, 1204 (1967).
20See Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D.D.C. 1967).
112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1940). This case involved a suit by a citizen of the
Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands seeking a determination that the defendant
did not possess the requisite qualifications for holding the office of Resident Commissioner of the Commonwealth to the United States. The court dismissed the
complaint upon the grounds that it raised a political question over which the court
had no jurisdiction and also that the court had no authority to pass upon the
qualifications of a delegate from a territory.
2
8Id. at 38.
20 279 U.S. 597 (1929). Barry, upon which the respondents in Powell relied
heavily, involved the power of the Senate to issue an arrest warrant to summon a
witness to give testimony concerning a senatorial election.
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declared that certain powers had been conferred upon the Houses of Congress that were not legislative, but were judicial in nature, and that
among these judicial powers is that of judging the qualifications of members." The Court said that a judgment in exercise of those powers is
"beyond the authority of any other tribunal to review."31 But in Powell
the Court leaped over these apparent hurdles by ignoring Sevilla and
distinguishing Barry.3
The respondents relied on Sevilla and Barry in contending that under
article 1, section 5,33 there was a "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment" 34 to the House to determine Powell's qualifications. They
argued that the House, and the House alone, has power to judge who
is qualified to be a member. The Court, to determine the merits of the
respondents' arguments, was required to interpret the Constitution:
If examination of § 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the
House judicially unreviewable power to set qualifications for membership and to judge whether prospective members meet those qualifications, further review of the House determination might well be barred
by the political question doctrine. On the other hand, if the Constitution gives the House power to judge only whether elected members
possess the three standing qualifications set forth in the Constitution,
further consideration would be necessary to determine whether any
of the other formulations of the political question doctrine are in35
extricable from the case at bar.
Stated differently, if the constitutionally enumerated qualifications are
minimum standards for the House to judge its members, then judicial
30
Id. at 613.
31Id.

8

1Barry provides no support for respondents' argument that this case is not
justiciable, however. First, in Barry the Court reached the merits of the controversy, thus indicating that actions allegedly taken pursuant to Art. I, § 5,
are not automatically immune from judicial review. Second, the quoted
statement is dictum; and, later in the same opinion, the Court noted that the
Senate may exercise its power subject "to the restraints imposed by or
found in the implications of the Constitution." Third, of course, the statement in Barry leaves open the particular question that must first be resolved
in this case: the existence and scope of the textual commitment to the
House to judge the qualifications of members.
395 U.S. at 519 n.40 (citation omitted).
" "Each House shall be the judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications
of its own members . .. ."
"' 395 U.S. at 519. If any of the six tests formulated in Baker are met, the case
may involve a political question and therefore be non-justiciable. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
33 395 U.S. at 520-21.
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review of its determination is a political question since the issue is textually
committed to a coordinate political department. On the other hand, if
those specified requirements are maximum standards, the issue has not
been committed to a coordinate department and the extra-constitutional
action of the House is subject to judicial scrutiny unless any other of
Baker's formulations can be applied to the facts of the case.
The Court held that the standards were maximum: "[0] ur examination of the relevant historical materials leads us to the conclusion that
...the Constitution leaves the House without authority to exclude any
person, duly elected by his constituents, who meets all the requirements
for membership expressly prescribed in the Constitution." 6 Since article
1, section 5 is a "textually demonstrable commitment" to the House to
judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution, the
"'textual commitment' formulation of the political question doctrine does
not bar federal courts from adjudicating petitioners! claims."-'
Adam
Clayton Powell was duly elected and was not ineligible to serve under
any provision of the Constitution; therefore the House was without power
8
to exclude him from its membership.
Since there are no cases interpreting the meaning of the phrase to
"judge the qualifications of its members," the Court had to look to the
records of the debates during the Constitutional Convention."9 Early in
the Convention, George Mason of Virginia had moved to include a property qualification for members of the legislature. The Convention adopted
this proposal and instructed the Committee of Detail to draft such a
qualification. The committee's report of August 6 provided that: "The
Legislature . . .shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifica-

tions of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the
said Legislature shall seem expedient." 40

The debate on this proposal is a great source of the Framers' view
of the qualifications issue. James Madison stated that the proposal would
vest
11 Id. at 522. The Court expressed no view on the issue of whether federal courts

could review a factual determination by the House that a member did not meet
one of
the prescribed qualifications. Id. at 521, n.42.
37 Id. at 548.
5 Id. at 550.
"Much of the Court's discussion of the Convention proceedings is taken from
C. WAuEN, THE MAINiG OF THE CoNSTITUTIO N 418-26 (1926) [hereinafter cited
as WARREN]. In his arguments before the Supreme Court, Powell's counsel relied
heavily on Professor Warren's analysis.
" Id. at 418. See generally, Farrand 179.
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[a]n improper and dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the
Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert
the Constitution .

. .

. It was a power also, which might be made

subservient to the views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications
founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in
41
order to keep out partisans of a weaker faction.
It is significant that Madison aimed his argument not at the imposition
of a property qualification per se, but at the delegation to the legislature of
discretionary power to establish any qualifications.4 2 Referring to the
British Parliament's assumption of the power to regulate the qualifications
of both electors and elected, Madison went on to note that "the abuse
they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made
the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views
of political or Religious parties. 4 3
The Convention obviously concurred with Madison's views, for both
the proposal to give to Congress power to establish qualifications in general and the proposal for a property qualification were defeated. 44 It is
within this context that on the same day (August 10, 1787) the Convention
agreed to article 2, section 5 of the Constitution, which provided that
"Each House shall be the judge of the . . . qualifications of its own

members."45
One additional decision made that day is also important in determining
the meaning of article 1, section 5. When the proposal to empower each
House to expel its members was discussed, Madison observed that "the
right of expulsion . . . was too important to be exercised by a bare

majority of a quorum: and in emergencies one faction might be dangerously abused."4 He therefore moved that "with the concurrence of twothirds" be inserted. The motion was approved. The Court in Powell
considered this decision highly significant:
[T]he Convention's decision to increase the vote required to expel,
because that power was "too important to be exercised by a bare
"Farrand

249-50;

WARREN

420.

"Chief Justice Warren also made note of this fact. 395 U.S. 534.
"J.

MADIsoN, NoTEs OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION

OF 1787 at

429 (A. Koch ed. 1966).

420-21.
" Id. at 419.
"'WARREN

"J.

MADIsoN, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

431 (A. Koch ed. 1966).

1787 at
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majority," while at the same time not similarly restricting the power
to judge qualifications, is compelling evidence that they considered the
latter already limited by the standing qualifications previously adopted.47
It seems only logical that if the Convention voted to require a two-thirds
vote of a House to expel a member, it was not willing to allow either
House to exclude a member-elect for any reason at all merely by a
48
majority vote.
Another source for examining the intent of the Framers is The
49
Federalist,
a series of essays written for the express purpose of explaining the Constitution. Madison, for example, states in one of his papers:
"The qualifications of the elected being less carefully and properly defined
by the State Constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible
of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the
Convention."5 Hamilton expressed similar thoughts by saying, "[t]he
qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen... are defined
and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature."51
Such authorities are persuasive. 2
There are, of course, arguments that article 1, section 2 establishes
only minimum standards. One such argument, relying on a change by
the Committee of Style in the form of article 1, section 2, was proposed
by the respondents in Powell, but rejected by the Court.5" Another
argument is that in addition to the age, citizenship, and inhabitancy
qualifications of article I, section 2, there are other constitutional disqualifications ;54 thus this provision cannot provide maximum congressional
17

395 U.S. at 536.

This argument is precisely that of Professor Warren. WARREN 424.
"THE FEmALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
O TE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 354 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)
(J. Madison).
:THE FEDERA'LIST No. 60, at 409 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
'Professor Warren has concluded:
As the Constitution, as then drafted, expressly set forth the qualifications of
age, citizenship and residence, and as the Convention refused to grant to
Congress power to establish qualifications in general, the maxim expressio
unius exclusio alterius would seem to apply . . . . The elimination of all
power in Congress to fix qualifications clearly left the provisions of the
Constitution itself as the sole source of qualifications.
WARREN 421-22.

" 395 U.S. at 525-26. The respondents argued that the change made by the
Committee of Style in Article I, § 2 from positive statements of qualifications to
the present negative form evidenced a design to give Congress the power to deny
a seat if it deeemed one "unfit" for reasons other than the meeting of the
enumerated requirements. Id.
" Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the Constitutional Issues in the Powell and
Related Cases, 17 J. PuB. LAw 103 (1968). First, any person convicted after ir-
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standards. But this argument, far from rebutting the theory of express
qualifications, actually strengthens it. For if the Framers saw fit to list
qualifications for office in the Constitution, they must have intended to
preclude the addition of any others by the Houses of Congress.
Having decided that the issue in Powell was not textually committed
to another branch of government, the Court still had to resolve other
considerations. The respondents contended as an alternative theory that
the case presented a political question under the Baker formulations
because judicial resolution of Powell's claim would produce the "potentiality of embarrassment" from a confrontation between equal branches
of the federal government. 5 The Court also had to overcome the suggestion that a determination in his favor would express a "lack of the
But the Constitution is the
respect due" a coordinate department.
"supreme Law of the Land" 7 and it is the responsibility of the Supreme
Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of this document."" As stated in
Cooper v. Aaron :9
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme
Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a
unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental
and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable case of
peachment by the Senate is disqualified not only from serving in Congress, but also
may not "hold and enjoy any Office, of honor, Trust or Profit under the United

States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
A second disqualification is found in article I, § 6: members of Congress may
not hold any other "office under the United States."
The guaranty clause of article IV, §4 points to another disqualification. This
provision guarantees "every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849), the Court interpreted
this article to mean that Congress has the unreviewable power to decide what
government is the established one in a state. If Congress can acknowledge that a
state has a republican government and thus accept its representatives, it must also
have the authority to disqualify Congressmen elected in a state not having a
republican form of government. Dionisopoulous supra, at 114.
An additional provision pertaining to qualifications is article VI, clause 3, requiring that all public officials, national and state, "shall be bound by oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . ." This Provision was recently interpreted to mean that a "legislator ... can be required to swear to support the
Constitution of the United States as a condition of holding offlce. Bond v. Floyd,
385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966) (dictum) (emphasis added).,
r 395 U.S. at 548.

raId.

CoNsT. art. VI, § 2.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
S358 U.S. 1 (1958).

"U.S.

58
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that "It is emphatically the province and
Marbury v. Madison....
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This decision
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle
has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a
permanent and indispensable feature of our Constitutional system.60
Determination of Powell's right to be seated by the House thus but required the Court to perform its duty as ultimate interpreter of the
Constitution. It is not unusual for the federal courts to interpret the
Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given by
another branch. Such a division occurs whenever congressional acts are
declared unconstitutional. Any conflict between the branches of government that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts'
avoiding their constitutional duties.0 '
The major impact of Powell is its effect on the political question
doctrine. The doctrine has, at the very least, been seriously undermined
by the holding in Powell. The formulations in Baker relating to the
potential embarrassment or lack of respect of coordinate branches of government must be considered as having been read out of the doctrine. If the
Supreme Court has the power, indeed the mandate, to hear all questions involving constitutional interpretation, then these bases of the political
question doctrine are no longer viable; judicial review of constitutional
construction of another branch of the government is, by its very nature,
an intrusion upon the traditional concept of separation of powers.
Although the potential embarrassment of a coordinate branch has
been eliminated by Powell as a test for political questions, the textual commitment concept remains. The Court in Powell did not find a textual commitment; however, certain powers do seem textually committed exclusively
to a branch of government others than the judiciary,"2 and in such cases
determinations by that branch would present non-justiciable political
questions.
It is perhaps significant that the Court was unwilling to speculate
what the result might have been had Powell been expelled from the House
00 Id. at 18.
61 395 U.S. at 549.
02 For example, there can be little doubt that the powers given Congress by
Article I, § 8 are exclusively reserved to the legislature. In addition, Article I in
§§ 3 & 4 gives Congress, and not the courts, the power to impeach and to try impeacbments.
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rather than excluded.0 Whether the authority of the House under
article 1, section 5 to expel a member "with the Concurrence of two-thirds"
constitutes an unreviewable textual commitment remains to be answered.
Yet surely a legislative body has the authority to police the conduct of
its own members. To hold otherwise is to conclude that it is at the
mercy of its unscrupulous or disruptive legislators.
The specific holding of Powell--that a duly elected legislator cannot
be excluded if he meets the constitutionally specified requirements-is of
little significance in the day-to-day practice of law. Its real importance
to the practitioner is in the partial collapse of the political-question doctrine as an aid to a policy of judicial self-restraint. It would seem that
Powell has provided authority for federal courts to hear important constitutional issues previously held to be non-justiciable.
NEILL HOWARD FLEISHMAN

Criminal Procedure-Juries in the Juvenile Justice System?
In re Gault' indicated in dictum that a juvenile hearing must meet
the basic requirements of due process. 2 Duncan v. Louisiane held that
trial by jury in non-petty criminal cases is a basic requirement of due
process. The logical completion of the syllogism is: A juvenile hearing must involve a jury if the youth's offense is not petty or his term
0"395 U.S. at 508. The Court also expressed no view on what, if any, limitation
may exist on Congress' expulsion powers. Id. at 507 n.27.
'387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'The Court in Gault said that in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966),

[w]e announced... that while "We do not mean ...

to indicate that the

hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal
trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; .

.

. we do hold that the

hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." We reiterate that view, here in connection with a juvenile court
adjudication of "delinquency" ....
3,87 U.S. at 30 (footnote omitted). The Court in Gault was silent about trial
by jury: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), had not yet been decided,
and the facts might not have presented the issue in any event since Gerald
Gault's offense if committed by an adult could not have brought a sentence of
longer than two months. Id. at 8-9. The specific holding of Gault went only
so far as to require notice of the charges, id. at 33-34; the right to be represented by counsel or by appointed counsel in cases of poverty, id. at 41; the
privilege to remain silent, id. at 55; and the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, id. at 56-57.
8391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).

